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Abstract 
Based on data collected from the Execucomp database concerning S&P 1,500 U.S. firms 
over the period 1992 to 2013, we evaluate whether CEO gender affects firm performance. 
We also examine CEO performance in terms of company risk. Our research reveals that 
on average the gender of the CEO has no significant effect on firm performance. 
Specifically, our research shows that the gender of CEO does not affect the firm risk level, 
and in terms of stock return, the difference is not significant between female and male 
CEOs. Furthermore, We divide firms into high risk and low risk groups based on their β, 
where β greater than one is considered high risk and β less than one is considered low 
risk.  As a result of this analysis there is no evidence that CEO gender has a significant 
impact on firm performance regardless of the company risk level. 
 
Keywords:  CEO gender; Firm performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  iv 
Dedication 
This project is dedicated to our families and friend who have been our constant source of 
inspiration. Without their love and support, this project would not have been made 
possible. 
  v 
Acknowledgements 
We would like to thank Prof. Amir Rubin for his support throughout this project. 
  vi 
Table of Contents 
Approval .......................................................................................................................................... ii 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iii 
Dedication ....................................................................................................................................... iv 
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................... v 
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................ vi 
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 1 
2. Literature review .......................................................................................................................... 3 
2.1 Gender and firm performance ........................................................................................... 3 
2.2 Gender and governance risk .............................................................................................. 5 
3. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................................... 6 
4. Sample description ....................................................................................................................... 9 
5. CEO gender and firm performance ............................................................................................ 10 
6. Summary .................................................................................................................................... 11 
7. Reference .................................................................................................................................... 12 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ 15 
List of Tables .................................................................................................................................. 16 
Table 1 Personal characteristic of female CEOs and male CEOs from 1992 to 2013 ................... 16 
Table 2.1.1 Average abnormal return of each gender in percentage .............................................. 17 
Table 2.1.2 Correlation of firm risk level (β0) with CEO gender .................................................. 18 
Table 2.2.1 Correlation of stock (
iR ) return with CEO gender ...................................................... 19 
Table 2.2.2 Company risk and firm performance of female CEOs and male CEOs ...................... 20 
 
  1 
1. Introduction 
Based on statistics, although men still dominate top executive positions, the percentage of 
female CEOs has increased gradually from 0.23% to 4.05% in the past few decades 
(Figure 1). Much of the established literature shows that gender diversity in top 
management positions leads to better firm performance (Campbell and Vera 2008; Dezsö 
and Ross, 2012). However, the direct relationship between gender of the CEO and firm 
performance is a relatively new field of study. Using data obtained from the Execucomp, 
containing S&P 1500 U.S. firms from 1992 to 2013, this paper reviews the personal 
characteristics of female and male CEOs and then analyses whether the gender of the 
CEO has an impact on the firm performance. The analysis is based on comparing the 
performance of female and male CEOs that headed the same company. Generally, we 
select companies that had both female and male CEOs throughout their corporate history. 
Moreover, we evaluate firm performance based on the company’s stock return during the 
first 3-4 years of a CEO’s tenure. The final controlled sample enables us to examine the 
direct relationship between firm performance and CEO gender. In addition, we evaluate 
whether the company risk will affect the relationship between firm performance and CEO 
gender. 
 
This paper is motivated by previous studies stating that there are biological differences 
between males and females, which lead to different leadership styles of females 
compared to males. For example, Huang and Kisgen (2012) state that from an investment 
aspect men are more aggressive and tend to engage in mergers and acquisitions and run 
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companies with higher leverage. This in turn leads to lower return of acquisition and a 
shorter firm survival period. Whereas firms run by female CEOs engage in fewer 
acquisitions, due to their less aggressive nature, and thus they have higher returns and a 
longer survival period. 
 
Our results reveal that on average CEO gender has no significant effect on firm 
performance. After we divide companies in our sample by their risk levels (Table 2.2.2), 
we find that although companies are classified as high risk or low risk firms, there is still 
no significant difference in firm performance between female and male CEOs. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature related to 
the relationship between gender and firm performance. Specifically, it includes two main 
aspects: 1) the relationship between gender and firm performance, and 2) the relationship 
between gender and risk aversion levels. Section 3 discusses the methodology including 
research design, sample selection and variable definitions. Section 4 discusses sample 
description. Section 5 analyses whether CEO gender affects firm risk, the relationship 
between firm performance and gender, and examines the influence of company risk in the 
relationship between firm performance and CEO gender. Section 6 summarizes our 
findings and the limitations of our paper. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1 Gender and firm performance 
The relationship between gender and firm performance is a relatively new field of study 
(Khan and Vieito, 2013). Studies that examine the relationship between CEO gender and 
firm performance (e.g., Khan and Vieito, 2013; Peni, 2014) reveal that companies with 
female executives experience an increase in performance compared to those managed by 
their male counterparts. Krishnan and Parsons (2008) find that firms with high gender 
diversity in senior management are positively and significantly correlated with high 
earnings quality. They also find that firms with more females in senior management are 
more profitable and have higher stock returns after IPOs than those with fewer females in 
senior management team. Also Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader (2003), based on 127 large 
US companies, find evidence that companies with a higher number of females on board 
have higher profitability compared to their average sector profitability. Moreover, 
Welbourne, Cycyota and Ferrante (2007), using data from 534 IPO firms, find that 
having females in the top management team leads to better firm performance and greater 
shareholders wealth. Adler (2001), based on Fortune 500 companies, finds that 
companies with a greater number of female executives exceed industry median 
profitability. Catalyst, a research and advisory organization that studies issues of females 
and workplace, examines the profitability of Fortune 500 corporations from 1996 to 2000. 
They find that firms with higher gender diversity outperform those with less gender 
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diversity with respect to return on equity and return to shareholders. Smith, Smith, and 
Verner (2006), use data of 2,500 largest Danish firms, also find that a positive 
relationship between gender diversity and firm performance which is measured by 
several accounting-based performance measures. However, they caution that any effect is 
closely tied to the qualifications of individual female top managers. These studies show 
that having a mix of females and males in top management positions results in better firm 
performance and higher return to shareholders. 
 
However, some studies show that the relationship between women executives and firm 
performance is not significant or negative. Campbell and Vera (2008), based on a sample 
of Spanish firms, find no clear relationship between female board members and firm 
value. Lee and Marvel (2013) investigate 4540 Korean firms in 2002 and conclude that 
gender of entrepreneurs is not a determinant of firm performance, while Adams and 
Ferreira (2008) find that the average effect of gender diversity on market value and 
operating performance is negative in companies with strong governance. Also Triana and 
Trzebiatowski (2013) illustrate that gender diversity on board can propel or impede 
strategic change of a company after they examine how firm performance and board 
gender diversity affect the strategic change of sample companies. Another study takes 
gender of top executives and companies stock price into account. Wolfers (2006) 
examines data on S&P 1500 firms from 1992 to 2004 and finds no systematic differences 
in stock returns in female CEO managed firms. 
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Another study works on shareholders’ reaction when a company announces the 
appointment of either a female or male CEO. Lee and James (2003), based on a sample of 
1,556 announcements for firms, find that shareholders respond more negatively to the 
announcement of female CEO appointments than to male CEO appointments. However, 
shareholders respond less negatively to female who takes on the CEO position from 
within the company than to those who are promoted externally.  
 
2.2 Gender and governance risk 
Most of the studies indicate that females are more risk adverse than males. Huang and 
Kisgen (2012) find that companies with female executives are less likely to make 
mergers and acquisitions and issue debt than companies with male executives. Martin, 
Nishikawa and Williams (2009), find evidence that firms with high risk tend to appoint 
female CEOs in order to reduce risk. Elsaid and Ursel(2011), based on the data of 679 
CEO successions in North American firms, conclude that a change in CEO gender, i.e. 
from male to female, reduces firm risk.  Faccio, Marchica, and Murac (2012) document 
that corporations run by female executives have lower leverage, less volatile earning and 
a higher chance of survival than those run by male executives. The difference risk 
tolerance also exists in mutual fund investment.  Niessen and Ruenzi (2006) find that 
female fund managers tend to invest in more stable investment and trade significantly 
less than their male counterparts do. 
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In contrast to findings for the population, Adams and Funk (2012) find that female 
directors are less tradition and security oriented and more risk loving than their male 
counterparts. Thus, having a female on board may not necessarily lead to more risk-
adverse decision making.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
In the sample description section, we utilize CEO information data from Execucomp 
database that includes all CEOs’ information from 1992 to 2013 in U.S. firms. This CEO 
information data includes basic information of firms, such as cusip, permno, and basic 
information of CEOs, such as gender, fiscal year, employee ID, and age. We summarize 
the personal characteristics of female CEOs and male CEOs. Specifically, we compare 
average age, average tenure, average percentage of ownership, and average total 
compensation between female and male CEOs. We also show the growth of female CEOs 
in percentage from 1992 to 2013 (Figure 1).  
 
In section 5 we merge the CEO information data with firm performance information from 
the CRSP database which includes monthly stock returns and monthly value-weighted 
returns with dividends. After this merge, we apply the following steps to obtain our final 
controlled sample. Firstly, we select CEOs who have tenure of at least 3 years. Secondly, 
for simplicity purposes, we delete the data after the fourth year of the CEOs’ tenure. 
Therefore, after the second step, all CEOs have 36 to 48 months of data since they are 
appointed as CEO.  The final step is to retain firms that have had both male and female 
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CEOs in their lifetime. Our final controlled sample includes 71 companies and 183 
CEOs.  
 
Some previous studies conclude that different CEO gender may affect firm risk (Elsaid 
and Ursel,2011),  we verify whether appointment of a CEO with a different gender is 
associated with a change in systematic risk . 
To determine whether CEO gender influences firm risk level, we run a regression of firm 
risk factor on gender in two steps. We first calculate firm risk factor during each CEO’s 
tenure based on the following formula: 
 i           0 s       
where iR  is monthly stock return,  is the abnormal return for CEO, 0  is the coefficient 
of value-weighted return including dividends, and Rs  is value weighted return including 
dividend. 
 
Given the abnormal return for each CEO, we calculate average mean of abnormal return 
for female and male CEOs respectively (Table 2.1.1). We first measure the firm's risk 
level during the tenure of a particular CEO ( 0 ), and then run a new regression of firm 
risk level ( 0 ) on CEO gender dummy (Gd).  This formula is shown below:  
   0       0    1    
where 0  is the firm risk level during each  CEO’s tenure that is obtained from the first 
step, 0Con  is the constant given by the regression, 1  is the coefficient of gender dummy, 
and Gd is gender dummy which equals one for female CEO, and zero for male CEO. 
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After these two steps of regression, the coefficient of gender dummy 1  represents the 
average excess firm risk caused by female CEOs over male CEOs. This regression result 
is shown in Table 2.1.2. 
 
In order to find the difference in firm performance of female CEOs and male CEOs ,we 
run a regression for each company where the dependent variable is monthly stock return 
of the firm and the independent variables are gender dummy, the age of CEO and  value-
weighted return with dividends. This regression will directly give us the correlation 
between stock return and CEO gender. The general formula we use is: 
 i       1      2         3 s               
where iR  is monthly stock return, 1Con is the constant given by regression, 2 is the 
coefficient of gender dummy, Gd is gender dummy which equals to zero for male and 
one for female, 3 is the coefficient of value-weighted return with dividend , sR is the 
monthly value-weighted return with dividends, 4  is the coefficient of the age of CEO, 
and Age is the age of CEO. 
 
It is notable that in our regression the coefficient of gender dummy 2 represents average 
excess return earned by female CEOs above male CEOs. The coefficient of value-
weighted return with dividend 3  represents company risk. 
 
After we run the regression of stock return on value-weighted return with dividends, age 
and gender dummy, we have data for 71 companies. We calculate average for each 
coefficient in the regression and show the t test result in table 2.2.1. According to the 
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coefficient of value-weighted return with divided ( 3 ), we divide our companies into two 
different groups: high risk companies whose 3  is greater than one and low risk 
companies whose 3  is less than one.  Within each group, we run t test for the 
coefficients of gender dummy ( 2 ) (Table 2.2.2). The t mean of 2 represents average 
excess return made by female CEOs over male CEOs. Therefore, we can understand 
whether the risk level of a company will affect the relationship between firm performance 
and CEO gender. 
 
4. Sample description 
Table 1 is the statistical summary of personal characteristics for female and male CEOs. 
As we can see from the table, on average, female CEOs are approximately 3 years 
younger than male CEOs. As to tenure, we observe that the tenure of male CEOs is about 
2 years longer than female CEOs. And in the case of ownership, there is no significant 
difference. This is also true for compensation, though on average female CEOs receive 
lower compensation then male CEOs; the difference is only 0.66% of total compensation 
of female CEOs. 
 
Figure 1 shows that although the majority of CEOs are male, the percentage of female 
CEOs has increased significantly during the past decade. Specifically, the percentage of 
female CEOs increased from only 0.23% to 4.05% from 1992 to 2013. 
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5. CEO gender and firm performance 
Table 2.1.1 shows the average of the abnormal return earned by female and CEOs. We 
can see that on average female CEOs have earned higher abnormal return than male 
CEOs. The difference is 0.00683%. At 5% significance level, the average abnormal 
returns of female CEOs and male CEOs are significant. 
 
From table 2.1.2, the coefficient of female CEO is 0.725019, which means that on 
average female CEOs contribute excess risk to firm than male CEOs do. However, 
according to the p value, this difference is not significant at 5% significance level. 
Therefore, we can conclude that there is no significant relationship between CEO gender 
and firm risk level. 
 
Table2.2.1 shows that on average approximately 2.0734 basis points excess return is 
earned by male CEOs over female CEOs However, at 5% significance level, this 
difference is insignificant and thus we cannot confirm that overall female CEOs 
outperform male CEOs. Combined with the conclusion firm table 2.1.2, we find that 
there is no significant relationship between CEO gender and firm performance. 
 
From Table 2.2.2, we can see that in both risk groups, thought the coefficients of female 
CEO are different with different firm risk level, at 5% significant level, the performance 
of female and male CEOs is not significantly different regardless of the company is at the 
high or low risk level. 
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6. Summary 
Based on data collected from Execucomp database and the CRSP database concerning 
S&P 1,500 US firms over the  period from 1992 to 2013,  we analyse whether firms 
managed by female CEOs contribute to different  firm risk level and performance from 
those managed by male CEOs. In addition, we examine whether company risk affects 
correlation between CEO gender and firm performance. 
 
Our result reveals that there is no significant correlation between the CEO gender and 
firm performance. However, there are limitations of our findings. The total sample of 
female CEOs is relatively small and our data is only limited to U.S. firms. In addition, 
our final controlled samples contain only the first three to four years of CEOs’ tenure. 
These limitations may affect our conclusion. 
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List of Figures 
Figure 1 Growth of female CEOs 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the growth of female CEOs from 1992 to 2013. 
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List of Tables 
Table 1 Personal characteristic of female CEOs and male CEOs from 
1992 to 2013 
 
Personal characteristics 
 Female CEOs  Male CEOs T test-mean 
diff. 
 N.obs.  Mean  N.obs.  Mean  
Age became 
CEO 
157  52.27  6533  55.35 3.08*** 
Tenure 68  6.34  3631  8.44 2.10*** 
Ownership 67  0.33%  1515  0.37%     0.0004 
Total 
compensation 
123  5680.35  3406  5642.64 -37.71*** 
Age became CEO is the age when the executive became CEO. Tenure is the number of years since the 
CEO was appointed. Ownership is the percentage of total shares owned by CEO. Total compensation is the 
total annual compensation of executives in thousands. N.obs. is the number of CEOs in the sample. Mean is 
the t mean for each variable. *** represents significance level of 5%.  
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Table 2.1.1 Average abnormal return of each gender in percentage 
 
Gender Average abnormal return 
 
No. of Observations 
 
p-value 
Female 0.39031% 73 0.0373*** 
Male 0.38348% 110 0.0398*** 
Abnormal 
return diff. 0.00683% 
  
Table 2.1.1 provides the t test result of monthly abnormal return of each gender in percentage. Abnormal 
return is the intercept of a first step regression where the dependent variable is the firm’s monthly return 
and the independent variable is the value-weighted index. This first step regression is run only for 
companies that had at least one female CEO for at least 36 consecutive months. If that is the case, all male 
CEOs that ran the company for at least 36 months are also included in the calculation of alpha. That leads 
to a sample of 183 CEOs, of which 73 are females. *** represents significance level of 5%.  
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Table 2.1.2 Correlation of firm risk level (β0) with CEO gender 
Dependent variable  Firm risk level  
Independent variables  p-value 
Constant 1.114782 0.000 
Female CEO 0.725019 0.541 
No. observations 183  
The table provides regression results where beta is run on Female CEO, which is an indicator that equals 
one if the CEO is female, and zero if it is male. The dependent, beta, is the coefficient of value-weighted 
index from a first step regression where the dependent variable is the firm’s monthly return and the 
independent variable is the value-weighted index. This first step regression is run only for companies that 
had at least one female CEO for at least 36 consecutive months and one male CEO for at least 36 months. 
If that condition is met, all male CEOs that ran the company for at least 36 months are also included in the 
calculation of alpha. That leads to a sample of 183 CEOs, of which 73 are females.  
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Table 2.2.1 Correlation of stock (
iR ) return with CEO gender 
Dependent variable Stock return  
Independent variables Mean p-value 
Intercept -.0098427 0.8640 
Female CEO -.0020734 0.7019 
Market return 1.137336 0 
Age 0.0002631 0.7598 
No. of observation 71   
Table2.2.1 provides the t test results of coefficients of each independent variable. These coefficients are 
obtained from the regression for each company where monthly stock return is run on monthly value-
weighted index, Female CEO and CEO age.  Female CEO is an indicator that equals one if the CEO is 
female, and zero if it is male.  This regression is run only for companies that had at least one female CEO 
for at least 36 consecutive months. If that is the case, all male CEOs that ran the company for at least 36 
months are also included in the regression. That leads to a sample of 71 companies.  
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Table 2.2.2 Company risk and firm performance of female CEOs and 
male CEOs 
Dependent variable Stock return  
Independent Variable Mean p-value 
High risk 
Intercept -0.0814649 0.4409 
Female CEO 0.0061152 0.4133 
Market return 1.616985 0 
age 0.0013288 0.4032 
No. of observation 37  
Low risk 
Intercept 0.6153651 0 
Female CEO -0.00109845 0.1639 
Market return 0.6142531 0 
Age -0.0008966 0.0805 
No. of observation 34   
The table provides the t test results of coefficients of each independent variable, according to the risk level 
of sample companies. These coefficients are obtained from the regression for each company where monthly 
stock return is run on monthly value-weighted index, Female CEO and CEO age.  Female CEO is an 
indicator that equals one if the CEO is female, and zero if it is male.  This regression is run only for 
companies that had at least one female CEO for at least 36 consecutive months. If that is the case, all male 
CEOs that ran the company for at least 36 months are also included in the regression. That leads to a 
sample of 71 companies. Sample companies are classified into high risk if the coefficient of value-weighted 
index is greater than one; and vice versa if the coefficient of value-weighted index is less than one. There 
are 37 companies with high company risk, while 34 companies with low company risk.  
 
 
 
